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█ Abstract In this article I discuss Athanasios Raftopoulos’ view on the epistemic role of attention and 
early vision, as outlined in his most recent book. I start by examining his view on attention, which he illus-
trates during his discussion of structured cognitive contents and their interactions with perceptual con-
tents, as well as during his discussion of selection effects. According to Raftopoulos, attention not only 
operates pre-perceptual input selection, but also influences perceptual processing during late vision bias-
ing the sampling of the iconic image for perceptual hypotheses-testing. Afterwards, I critically assess 
Raftopoulos’ conclusions about the epistemic role of early vision, which are based on his view about the 
role of attention. From this assessment, I raise a potential concern for his proposal in the form of a new 
problem of selection: the interesting epistemic consequences of cognitive penetrability either follow or do 
not follow from selection effects, depending on how these selection effects are construed, but regardless of 
the stage of visual processing in which they take place. 
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█ Riassunto Il ruolo epistemico della visione primaria: penetrazione cognitiva e selezione attentiva – In questo ar-
ticolo discuto la proposta di Athanasios Raftopoulos riguardo al ruolo epistemico dell’attenzione e della 
early vision, contenuta nella sua recente monografia. La mia discussione comincia da un esame delle sue 
idee riguardo all’attenzione, che illustra sia durante la sua discussione dei contenuti cognitivi strutturati e 
delle loro interazioni con i contenuti percettivi, sia durante la sua discussione degli effetti di selezione. Se-
condo Raftopoulos, l’attenzione non opera solamente una selezione pre-percettiva degli input, ma in-
fluenza anche i processi percettivi di late vision orientando il processo di valutazione delle ipotesi percetti-
ve sulla base dell’immagine iconica. Successivamente, valuto criticamente le conclusioni di Raftopoulos’ 
riguardo al ruolo epistemico di early vision, fondate sulla sua concezione del ruolo dell’attenzione. Da que-
sto esame, evidenzio una potenziale criticità nella sua proposta costituita da un nuovo problema della se-
lezione: le conseguenze epistemiche della penetrabilità cognitiva seguono o non seguono dai processi di 
selezione, a seconda di come tali effetti sono concepiti, ma indipendentemente dal livello nella serie dei 
processi visivi nel quale si verificano. 
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█ 1 Introduction 
 
IN HIS BOOK COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY and 
the epistemic role of perception Athanasios 
Raftopoulos wants to secure a theory-neutral 
ground for perception and belief. He devel-
ops an empirically informed theory which 
allows for close interaction between percep-
tion and cognition, while avoiding the dan-
gers of epistemological constructivism. In so 
doing, he provides the longstanding debate 
about cognitive penetrability and theory-
ladenness of empirical observation with two 
distinct and valuable contributions. On the 
one hand he offers an exhaustive and much 
needed synopsis of a nuanced debate which 
spans over Philosophy, Cognitive Psycholo-
gy, and Cognitive Neuroscience. In this re-
spect his work could be seen as a textbook for 
those who are interested in having a compre-
hensive and up-to date overview of this intri-
cate interdisciplinary debate. On the other 
hand, Raftopoulos proposes and argues for 
his own view on the interactions between 
perception and cognition, which is deeply 
anchored in current knowledge about the in-
ternal working of the perceptual system in 
the brain. This aspect of the book builds on a 
critical intake of the work of other main 
voices in the debate but aims to move for-
ward. He devises a picture of perception 
which is flexible enough to allow for direct 
influence of cognitive processes, such as 
those underlying beliefs and categorization, 
with the perceptual system. In his view, how-
ever, such influence is not so pervasive as to 
threaten the epistemic role of perception and 
sever the reliable connection between the 
subject and the world that we want percep-
tion to establish, in order to avoid the perni-
cious consequences of epistemological con-
structivism. The key to understanding this 
proposal is the neat division of perception 
into two separate stages, early and late vision. 
While he argues that the former is cognitive-
ly impenetrable and that it reliably and accu-
rately delivers information retrieved from 
the world, he offers reasons to believe that 
the latter interacts with cognition and con-
cepts, while not having conceptual and prop-
ositional contents itself. 
Raftopoulos
1
 offers a novel definition of 
cognitive penetration (henceforth CP) that 
builds upon extant accounts while avoiding 
many of the shortcomings of available defini-
tions. He focusses on the directness of a cog-
nitive influence on perception
2
 as well as on 
its consequences for the epistemic role of the 
supposedly penetrated perceptual processing 
stages.
3
 He convincingly highlights that even 
if all other conditions for CP are met, but the 
cognitive perceptual interaction is such that 
it does neither undermine nor enhance a giv-
en perceptual process’ epistemic role, than 
that process fails to be cognitively penetrat-
ed. Importantly, he is careful in excluding se-
lection effects from being instances of CP 
from the get-go. In so doing he follows the 
received view in the debate
4
 that if a cogni-
tive influence of perception merely selects, 
through attention, the input to perception, 
i.e. it affects what perception processes and 
not the way perceptual processing unfolds, 
than this is not an interesting case of CP be-
cause the epistemic role of perception in de-
livering reliable information about the world 
on which to ground perceptual beliefs is not 
altered in any way. 
Raftopoulos’ discussion is so wide and de-
tailed that presenting a critical assessment of 
the whole scope of his proposal goes far be-
yond the possibilities of a short commentary. 
Instead, in what follows I shall focus, at first, 
on two aspects of the book that I find of par-
ticular interest concerning its role as a synop-
sis of the whole debate. These are his discus-





 While I think that he does an 
excellent job at reporting and sharply criticis-
ing some aspects of these authors’ work, 
there are some important points that I wish 
to raise about his discussion of each of these 
authors respectively (§2 and §3). These indi-
vidual discussions serve as building blocks 
for my final assessment of one of the main 
theses advanced in Raftopoulos book (§4). 
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More specifically, I will raise a potential 
problem for his account of the epistemic role 
of early vision in the light of his view on at-
tentional selection effects, which is partly 
adopted from his own previous work and 
Siegel’s. 
 
█ 2 Structured cognitive contents and con-
ceptual spaces 
 
I would like to start this commentary by  
discussing Raftopoulos defence against some 
powerful objections raised by Burnston.
7
 For 
reasons of conciseness I shall not report the 
bulk of Burnston arguments, which 
Raftopoulos carefully and adequately covers 
in the book. I shall focus on his counterar-
guments instead. While I have some remarks 
on Raftopoulos’s discussion of Burnston, 
which I report below, this section also serves 
the purpose of introducing some of 
Raftopoulos’ ideas that shall become relevant 
for my discussion in the following sections.  
In a nutshell, Burnston claims that cogni-
tion and perception cannot interact in the 
way that a proponent of CP wants them to, 
namely through a direct influence of cogni-
tion on the contents of perception, because 
their respective contents have different for-
mats (corresponding to Dretske’s analog and 
digital formats).
8
 Cognitive contents are not 
specific enough to determine the nuanced 
effect that they supposedly exert on percep-
tion.
9
 Raftopouolos explicitly recognizes the 
import of this argument and initially high-
lights how, in his view, processes in late vi-
sion have hybrid content and that one could 
argue that cognition interacts with the sub-
set of contents in late vision that have the 
adequate format. However, Raftopoulos al-
so writes: 
 
I may hold that late vision has hybrid states 
and contents, but I also think that cognitive 
effects in late vision modulate the phenom-
enology of the visual scene, which means 
that cognition modifies perceptual pro-
cessing itself. In addition, I have argued that 
the cognitive effects are mediated through 
cognitively driven attention, which means 
that there is a mechanism that mediates the 
cognitive effects on perception and 




For the moment, let me focus on why 
Burnston rejects the possibility of an inter-
vening mechanism. The bulk of Burnston ob-
jection rests on the assumption that such in-
tervening mechanism would have to operate 
by translating the digital contents of the cog-
nitive states and processes into perceptually 
structured contents in order for cognition to 
have a direct and deterministic effect on per-
ception. However, cognitive contents lack 
the adequate informational richness for such 
a translation to obtain. Since cognitive con-
tents lack perceptual structure the translation 
mechanism cannot decide in a principled way 
which specific perceptual changes should fol-
low the translation of the cognitive content. 
To this objection, Raftopoulos replies in a 
very interesting way. Firstly, he argues that 
attentional mechanisms active in late vision 
operate by biasing perceptual competition in 
favor of those representations that are more 
compatible with the currently entertained 
hypotheses. These hypotheses in turn may 
themselves be determined by cognition, and 
this constitutes a direct effect of cognition 
onto perceptual processing itself, mediated 
by attention, that does not require any dedi-
cated translation mechanism: 
 
In late vision, the cognitive information 
transmitted top-down concerns the core 
characteristics of the object(s) that are 
hypothesized to exist in a perceived visual 
scene, or the relevant locations where 
most likely such information may exist. 
[…] the perceptual neuronal assemblies 
that encode the spatial or featural rele-
vant information receive an extra activa-
tional boost or have their responses 
sharpened and this biases the competition 
against neuronal assemblies that encode 




tively driven attention affects the activa-
tion values of the neurons in the relevant 
neuronal assemblies. This boost or sharp-
ening occurs in the course of perceptual 
processing and is not just an offline in-
crease in the baseline activation, as is the 
case in pre-cueing that affects neuronal 
activations before stimulus onset. Atten-
tion, by biasing the competition affects 




Secondly, Raftopoulos insists that even if 
Burnston is right in saying that cognitive 
contents have analog symbolic format, this 
does not entail that they lack any perceptual-
ly relevant structure. They can have an inter-
nal structure that maps onto a phenomenal 
similarity space.
12
 In the case of color, the ac-
tivation of a color concept does not trigger 
any perceptual process associated with that 
concept. The type of process that is triggered 
depends on the task at hand and the concept 
itself has an internal structure described as a 
set of values (in the case of color: hue, satura-
tion and brightness) which may be directly 
used by the perceptual system to bias percep-
tual competition in favor of the region in the 
phenomenal space corresponding to that set 
of values, thus altering perceptual processing 
in a direct way.  
In summary, Raftopoulos responds to the 
claim that there must be an intervening 
translation mechanism to mediate the inter-
actions between perception and cognition in 
late vision by attributing internal structure to 
symbolic conceptual representation and de-
scribing a direct attentional biasing mecha-
nism through which such cognitive structure 
is mapped directly onto ongoing perceptual 
processes.  
I believe that Raftopoulos’ reply to the 
problems raised by Burnston is on the right 
track and need only be supplemented by one 
further claim. According to Raftopoulos
13
 the 
activation of a concept like “heart” activates 
semantic information about the typical color 
of hearts which corresponds to a region in 
the color space and is fed top-down and lat-
erally to the visual system where it biases 
perceptual competition, through attentional 
modulation, in favor of a more compatible 
percept. This mechanism can explain color 
matching tasks where subject adjust the color 
of a background in the direction of the typi-




However, it is not clear how, in this 
mechanism, the typical color may be deter-
mined, especially since one might expect 
graded variations between the adjustments of 
different subjects. In this respect, one might 
push Burnston objection one step further and 
say that even if one accepts that a structured 
color concept can activate only the relevant 
color information due to the nature of the 
task and the corresponding region of the col-
or space in the perceptual system, by biasing 
the competition toward that region during 
percept formation, one still lacks an explana-
tion of the determinate adjustments that 
each individual makes. In order to solve this 
problem one needs a specific point in the 
color space rather than a region. Luckily, I 
think this problem may be readily solved by 
introducing a historical idiosyncratic com-
ponent into the picture. Namely that a sub-
ject previous experience with red hearts spec-
ifies the typical color of hearts for that sub-
ject as a point in the “red” region of the color 
space and this is the information that is re-
cruited upon activation of the concept rather 
than the regions itself. This helps explain 
why the perceived hue upon concept activa-
tion may vary between perceivers, even 
though there is a common tendency toward 
the overall typical color region of stimuli as-
sociated with that concept.  
However, regardless of this further direc-
tion in which one may take Raftopoulos’ re-
ply to Burnston, the discussion above shows 
how Raftopoulos believes attention to be the 
main mechanism responsible for the inter-
face between perceptual and cognitive pro-
cesses in late vision. 
This is extremely relevant for the next 
sections of my commentary. 
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█ 3 Selection effects, perceptual evidence 
and cognitive penetration 
 
In this section I discuss Raftopoulos’ 
treatment of the recent proposal by Siegel.
15
 
The purpose of this discussion is to highlight 
a potential problem for Raftopoulos treat-
ment of the epistemic role of early vision and 
the role of attention in CP, which I will dis-
cuss in the next section. Before beginning, I 
would like to point out that this section is 
dense with quotations. This is because the 
points I raise, here and in the next section, 
rely on some nuances of Raftopoulos’ and 
Siegel’s view on attention, perceptual evi-
dence and selection effects. In order to avoid 
potential misunderstandings of these views I 
thought it would be helpful to report them 
with these Author’s own words. 
I think Raftopoulos does an excellent job 
in situating a condensed review of Siegel’s 
proposal in the context of his own extensive 
discussion of the interactions between per-
ception and cognition. One of the aspects on 
which Raftopoulos focusses is the distinction 
between the selective and the responsive 
mode
16
 in which cognition may affect per-
ception. According to Raftopoulos, the first 
mode corresponds to attention selecting the 
inputs to perception from the distal scene, 
while the second mode corresponds to atten-
tion selecting among the contents of the 
iconic image, which is delivered by early vi-
sion, those that are better suited to test the 
hypotheses currently entertained by the sys-




These two ways roughly correspond to 
Siegel’s distinction between the selective 
and the responsive mode in which cogni-
tive states may affect perception. In the 
selective mode, the cognitive states select 
the distal stimuli that will be perceptually 
processed and, hence, which evidence 
perception will use to form a perceptual 
belief, a selection that takes place through 
the effects of cognitively driven spatial or 
object/feature-centered attention. It is 
widely acknowledged that this sort of ef-
fects is not a case of CP; CP purports to 
cover cases in which cognition affects the 
formation of the percept given the same 
input. In the responsive mode, the cogni-
tive states control which beliefs a perceiv-
er forms in response to a body of evi-
dence. In perception, this means that the 
cognitive states controlling the formation 
of the percept do so by controlling the 
way the evidence, in the form of low-level 
perceptual input, is handled; this is a typi-




This will become important during my 
discussion of the epistemic role of early vi-
sion in § 4. For the time being let me focus on 
one specific claim made by Raftopoulos while 
reviewing Siegel’s position, namely that 
Siegel excludes all selection effects from be-
ing cases of CP: 
 
Selection effects that merely select the in-
put to be perceptually processed, on the 
other hand, should be excluded from being 
instances of CP and since selection effects 
are the hallmark of the attentional effects 
on perception, attentional effects should 
not be considered cases of CP. In general, 
throughout her work, Siegel maintains that 
attention in any of its forms affects percep-
tion only indirectly, which means that at-
tention affects pre-perceptual or post-
perceptual stages but not perceptual pro-
cessing itself and, thus, it is not a case of 
CP. […] In other words, perceptual pro-
cessing is independent of attention, which 




In contrast to this position Raftopoulos 
argues that the processes of late vision inher-
ently involve attention and that the effect of 
attention on late vision are indeed internal 
and direct and that they correspond to 
Siegel’s responsive mode.  
 
Herein lies a problem afflicting Siegel’s 




well take place in late vision, where atten-
tion guides perceptual processes in order 
to test hypotheses concerning the identity 
of the distal object(s) by revisiting infor-
mation contained in the iconic image. In 
this case, the information selected is not 
in the environment but in a set of percep-
tual mental states and the selection is ef-
fectuated by cognitively driven attention, 
which means that the link from cognition 
to perception is internal, causal, and pure-
ly mental. In addition, the cognitive states 
affect perceptual processes and the con-
tents of the affected perceptual states; 
they do not merely select the input before 
perceptual processing begins, as Siegel 
seems to suppose. It follows that these at-
tentional effects meet Siegel’s own criteria 





Since these selection effects that happen in 
late vision are internal and direct, they count, 
contra Siegel, as genuine cases of CP. However, 
a few sentences below Raftopoulos seems to 
adopt the following view form Siegel: 
 
In the selective mode, therefore, attention 
selects from the environment which evi-
dence the perceptual system will use (it 
handpicks the evidence) but does not de-
termine the content of the evidence thus se-
lected. It selects, for example, some features 
of pairs of scissors that mimic features of 




This echoes Siegel’s metaphor of the tribu-
nal of experience recruited in her previous 
work: 
 
In general, visual experience purports to 
tell you what the world is like, allowing 
you to check your beliefs against reality. 
But if behind the scenes, the penetrating 
states are stacking the tribunal of experi-
ence in their own favor, then while expe-
rience will seem to let you check your be-
liefs against the world – to you, this will 
be just what’s happening – really you’ll 
just be checking your beliefs against your 




The idea of this metaphor is that an unbi-
ased jury that has to work with independent-
ly biased or poorly acquired evidence may 
still arrive at a reasonable verdict, given the 
evidence that it has. However, a biased jury 
may reach an unreasonable verdict even if it 
has all the evidence available. This is why se-
lection effect do not count, according to 
Siegel, as cases of CP. Selections effects cor-
responds to what Raftopoulos and Siegel ap-
propriately label handpicking of evidence. 
Whereas, keeping the metaphor going, for 
genuine CP to be the case one would need a 
direct influence on the jury’s judgments.  
Despite this initial recognition of the 
connection between selection effects that are 
not CP and evidence handpicking, later on 
Raftopoulos characterizes both the atten-
tional selection effects that concern the distal 
scene, and that happen prior to early vision, 
and those that concern the iconic image, 
which happen after early vision and during 
late vision as effects of evidence selection: 
 
[…] searching for relevant information in 
the distal scene, or in the iconic image, re-
spectively correspond to a certain extent 
to Siegel’s distinction between the selec-
tive mode and the responsive mode in 
which cognitive states may affect percep-
tion. The main difference between the 
way cognition affects perception by se-
lecting the input before the perceptual 
processing starts, and the way cognition 
affects perception during late vision is not 
that the one but not the other involves at-
tention because, as we saw, cognitively 
driven attention operates both when the 
environmental input is selected and dur-
ing late vision when it guides the hypoth-
esis testing. The main difference consists 
in the nature of the selected evidence. In 
the former case the evidence is in the en-
vironment, whereas in the latter it is 
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stored in the perceptual circuits of the 





This passage creates some tension be-
tween Raftopoulos apparent agreement with 
Siegel that cases of evidence handpicking are 
not genuine cases of CP and his insisting that 
attentional effects in late vision are. If atten-
tion also operates evidence selection from 
the iconic image in late vision, how does this 
differ from pre-perceptual evidence selection 
in such a way that the former constitutes a 
case of CP while the latter does not? I now 
have all the elements in place to rise, in the 
next section, my final worry for the theory of 
CP of late vision and the epistemic role of 
early vision advanced by Raftopoulos.  
 
█ 4 The epistemic role of early vision a new 
problem of selection? 
 
In the previous section, while discussing 
Raftopoulos take on the views advanced by 
Burnston and Siegel, I highlighted how, for 
Raftopoulos, the key mechanism for the inter-
action between cognitive processes and the 
perceptual processes of late vision is that of 
attentional biasing. Such a mechanism is di-
rect, internal to the subject’s mind, and does 
not require any translation of digital or sym-
bolic conceptual contents into analog percep-
tual ones. For these reasons he claims that it 
constitutes a genuine case of CP. On top of 
that Raftopoulos extensively argues that early 
vision is immune to such effects and, by being 
cognitively impenetrable, it anchors the per-
ceptual system to the world in a way that pre-
serves the epistemic role of perception in 
grounding perceptual beliefs. In this section I 
outline a potential problem that I can envisage 
for Raftopoulos’ view in the light of the 
aforementioned tenets of his theory. 
Let me start by elaborating on the epistemic 
role that Raftopoulos assigns to early vision: 
 
The epistemic role of early vision is con-
strained by the fact that early vision re-
trieves from the visual scene information 
that is fed to late vision and is used for the 
construction of the percept, in the for-
mation of which the semantic infor-
mation made available by cognition also 
plays a crucial role. Thus, the epistemic 
role of early vision consists in providing 




So far Raftopoulos is just telling us that 
early vision has the role of feeding late vision 
the information it needs to form the percept. 
This passage, taken in isolation, is silent 
about the possibility that the mechanism of 
early vision may be biased or otherwise fail to 
perform their information delivery task in an 
epistemically appropriate way. However, 
Raftopoulos clarifies these aspects in subse-
quent passages on the same topic. In particu-
lar he argues that early vision is affected by 
cognition only indirectly and that such indi-
rect effects do not threaten early vision’s ep-
istemic role. Thus, early vision is cognitively 
impenetrable. I shall grant this point, but let 
us examine what Raftopoulos means by say-
ing that the epistemic role of early vision is 
not threatened by cognition. 
In arguing that pre-cueing effects do not 
threaten the epistemic role of early vision 
Raftopoulos writes: 
 
Since the epistemic role of early vision 
consists in providing late vision with icon-
ic information concerning the visual scene 
that late vision will use to construct the 
percept, and since this information is re-
trieved by early vision from the environ-
ment, the epistemic role of early vision 
would be affected by pre-cueing if pre-
cueing effects could influence the pro-
cesses of information retrieval during ear-
ly vision. If they could, they would affect, 
either by diminishing or enhancing, the 
sensitivity of early vision in particular and 









vision could be considered as a fallible pro-
cess, suitable to having enhanced or de-
creased sensibility in its information retriev-
ing task. However, one of the book’s main 
purposes is precisely to argue that this is not 
the case. Early vision is not sensitive in such a 
way and the information it delivers to late 
vision, in the form of the iconic image, is a 
faithful and exhaustive representation of the 
distal scene. Later in the book Raftopoulos 
explicitly states what he takes the epistemic 
role of early vision to be: 
 
[...] the fact that early vision is not direct-
ly affected by cognition entails that early 
vision does indeed provide the cognitive-
free evidence needed for perception hav-







The information retrieved from the visual 
scene and stored in the iconic image re-
flects only the environment and the per-
ceptual makeup of the viewer and not any 
of the viewer’s cognitive states. This 
means that the information stored in the 
iconic image will contain information that 
is incongruent with the favored hypothe-
sis if such information exists in the envi-
ronment. Whether this information will 
be used during late vision to reject the fa-
vored hypothesis or whether the CP of 
late vision will lead to a testing of the hy-
pothesis that is biased in favor of this hy-
pothesis so that any incongruent infor-
mation be ignored is immaterial to the ep-
istemic role of early vision; the epistemic 
duty or responsibility of early vision was 
to deliver all available information and 
this it did. This makes it possible in prin-
ciple for late vision to reject the favored 
hypothesis since the disconfirming infor-
mation is there to be used. If early vision 
were CP, the recalcitrant information 
would not even be there to be used, in 
which case late vision would have no oth-
er choice but to confirm the favored hy-
pothesis; viewers would be doomed to 
seeing only what their cognitive states 
dictate. This, in turn, allows early vision 





These passages highlight how Raftopou-
los thinks of early vision as neutral arbiter 
who delivers all the available evidence to late 
vision regardless of a subject’s cognitive 
makeup. It is only during late vision that 
some of this evidence may be ignored to fa-
vor some hypotheses over others due to the 
influence of cognitive states.  
As mentioned, the argument that early vi-
sion is immune to cognition is motivated by 
consideration of the epistemic role of percep-
tion in general, which Raftopoulos wants to se-
cure, and it is grounded in empirical considera-
tion about the processing architecture of the 
perceptual system. However, the resulting con-
strual of early vision as an impenetrable percep-
tual stage that faithfully delivers all the infor-
mation available entails that the processes of 
early vision are not themselves assessable by 
any epistemic standard. In other words, early 
vision is epistemically infallible. Malfunctions 
of early vision may, of course, occur, but not 
due to the failure to comply to a given epistem-
ic norm. If everything in the system’s machin-
ery works properly, early vision will offer an 
exhaustive and accurate report on the external 
world. One problem that I see here is that such 
an epistemic role may also be assigned to the 
retina, or, more radically, to the external world 
itself. As long as the epistemic role of x is that of 
providing evidence for further deliberation or 
processing, distal stimuli in the visual scene and 
their retinal projections also perform this role, 
early vision becomes just the next step in this 
evidence delivery process.  
Matters become epistemically more inter-
esting when we get to late vision where be-
liefs, desires, emotions and such can in prin-
ciple influence the way in which the percep-
tual system forms the percept on the basis of 
the available evidence. This process, as 
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Raftopoulos’ acknowledges and argues for, 
could be biased toward ignoring or overesti-
mating some of the evidence thus resulting in 
modifications to the percept and deviations, 
positive and negative, from an epistemically 
neutral standard, which would have obtained 
in the absence of the biasing cognitive influ-
ences. Late vision is the only stage that is ep-
istemically assessable in this sense. The worry 
is that the epistemic role of early vision, as 
Raftopoulos envisages it, is too constrained 
to be distinguished from the evidence 
providing role of other pre-perceptual stages 
and that many of the problems associated 
with securing the epistemic role of percep-
tion may only have been pushed one step 
away from the world and within the percep-
tual system itself.  
On this latter consideration, the last point 
that I would like to highlight is that, in the 
light of the above discussion of the epistemic 
role of early vision, and of the way Raftopou-
los thinks of selection effects (§3), the CP of 
late vision endorsed by Raftopoulos may be 
exposed to analogue objections to those 
about pre-perceptual input selection failing 
to qualify as CP, that Raftopoulos also ac-
cepts. If in late vision cognitively-driven at-
tention biases perceptual processing toward 
an outcome consistent with the content of 
the cognitive states, but this happens by a se-
lective sampling of the “cognitively neutral” 
iconic image, which is the input to late vision 
delivered by early vision, how can such a bi-
asing process ultimately be distinguished 
from pre-perceptual input selection through 
spatial attention? Granted, attention as a 
neural mechanism may work very differently 
at this later stage of processing, its effect may 
be direct and internal to the perceptual sys-
tem, but from an epistemic point of view, it 
seems that late vision is also merely selecting 
where to look, i.e. what evidence to retrieve 
from the iconic image, and if such cases fail 
to constitute CP in the case of spatial atten-
tion and pre-perceptual input selection, 
Raftopoulos needs to offer a clearer explana-
tion of why this is not the case in late vision. 
The interpretation of Raftopoulos’ pro-
posal, which led me to the point raised above, 
seems confirmed in the following quotation, 
which also shows that Raftopoulos is fully 
aware of the parallel between distal-selection 
and selection in the iconic image: 
 
One could draw a parallel between the role 
of early vision in forming the iconic image 
by retrieving directly information from the 
environment, a iconic image, which, by be-
ing unaffected by cognitive influences, is 
“theory-neutral”, and the role of the distal 
stimulus when cognitive effects involve ex-
ternal causal links. Recall that all defini-
tions of CP exclude cognitive effects that 
operate through an external causal link 
from being cases of CP because in these 
cases cognition selects the stimulus that 
serves as input to perception, and CP is 
supposed to be about the possibility of 
having two different percepts while look-
ing at the same stimulus. […] So, as the dis-
tal stimulus is available to attentional ex-
ternal refocusing and this mitigates the re-
percussions of the cognitive influences, so 
the iconic image is available to internal at-





Here it seems to me that if the case of dis-
tal-selection is excluded from being a case of 
CP the same should hold for its analogue 
process of selection of evidence for testing 
hypotheses from the iconic image in late vi-
sion. The fact that the latter is internal to the 
perceptual system may not secure it as a case 
of cognitive-penetration in the way that 
Raftopoulos needs it to. Both would be in-
stances of mere input selection by attention, 
the only difference being that in one case the 
input is the distal stimulus and in the other it 
is the iconic image, i.e. the input to late vi-
sion. Recall the tribunal metaphor from the 
previous section. Both these cases of selec-
tion can be described as evidence handpick-
ing rather than alterations of the evidence 




ering during early vision is not altered by 
cognition. Thus, both would be instances of 
Siegel’s selective mode (§3).
29
  
One may describe both cases as a neutral 
jury that reaches an optimal verdict while be-
ing fed only part of the available evidence 
due to an independent biasing mechanism. In 
this situation there is no CP because the epis-
temic role of the jury itself would not be 
compromised and the influence is external to 
the jury. It does not matter if it was a cor-
rupted policeman (external to the tribunal) 
or a corrupted prosecutor (internal to the 
tribunal) who manipulated the evidence. Al-
ternatively, one may interpret the two cases 
of being cases of a corrupted and biased jury 
which pays attention only to evidence con-
genial to its prejudice. Here both instances of 
selection could potentially be cases of CP as 
the epistemic role of the jury is compromised 
in both, regardless of when the neutral evi-
dence has been being gathered and present-
ed. In any case, it seems to me that both cases 
deserve equal treatment when it comes to se-
lection of inputs being or not being a case of 
CP. This is why refocussing of attention 
helps mitigating the effects of cognitive in-
fluences in both cases, as Raftopoulos states 
in the passage mentioned above.  
 
█ 5 Conclusion 
 
Overall, I consider Raftopoulos’ book to 
be an invaluable guide through the very 
complex and longstanding debate about CP. 
Furthermore, I believe that Raftopoulos con-
siderable effort in securing the impenetrabil-
ity of early vision and describing, at several 
levels of analysis, the way in which percep-
tion and cognition may interact in late vision 
is convincing and largely successful. 
Ultimately, however, concerning his claims 
about attention being the main mechanism 
responsible for the cognitive penetrability of 
late vision, I have to agree with Lyons
30
 that 
the locus of CP is not really important. This is 
not because of the alleged cognitive penetra-
bility or impenetrability of early or late vision, 
but rather because selection effects either have 
or do not have pernicious epistemic conse-
quences, regardless of where they occur. One 
may be inclined to call them CP. I suppose 
Siegel
31
 would classify both as selection effects 
and thus not cases of CP, whereas for 
Raftopoulos selection from the iconic image 
in late vision is CP because it is internal to the 
perceptual system. However, this is, unsur-
prisingly for this debate, a matter of definition 
and if taken in isolation, it does not really set-
tle what is, perhaps, the most philosophically 
interesting question about CP, namely the 
question about its positive and negative con-
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